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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Das Sittliche Leben. Eine Ethik auf psychologischer Grundlage.

Mit einem Anhang: *Nietzsche's Zarathustra-Lehre.* VON HERMANN SCHWARZ. Berlin, Reuther and Reichard, 1901.—pp. xi, 417.

This work is a sequel to the author's *Psychologie des Willens*, which was reviewed in last January's issue of this journal. In that volume Schwarz attempted to work out a psychological basis for ethics. In this volume he raises a superstructure on that foundation. The two titles would naturally lead one to expect something scientific. What one finds is almost pure unadulterated dogmatism. The psychology of the will turns out to be an advocacy of an *a priori* faculty of preference or choice, exercised by the metaphysical entity called "the person." This person is sharply differentiated from his states and conditions and has the infallible faculty—which, however, he often allows himself to be cheated out of using—of discovering and choosing the empirically better of two voluntary actions. In case neither of two volitions is empirically better than the other, the same faculty makes one better than the other by an act in accordance with an *a priori* norm. This norm differs from Kant's *a priori* maxims of practical reason in that it is a *will* norm and not a norm of reason. We have then an ethical system analogous to that of Kant, but called by its author a "voluntaristic apriorism, which complements the rationalistic apriorism of Kant." "The synthetic preference-norms," says he, "cast the light which illumines at a stroke all moral life. With every other explanation, the concept of the morally better suffers, and loses its purity. Heteronomous elements, elements foreign to the will, attach themselves to the concept and crush it. It is only in the process of synthetic preference, that the concept of the morally better finds firm support" (pp. 45, 46). In the expression, elements "foreign to the will" (*willensfremde*), we have the keynote of this voluntaristic apriorism. Our feelings are wrought in us by natural compulsion. They represent the bondage of the natural man to mechanical law. Now, unless there is in us something absolutely free from this law, there can be no morality. We are thus regarded as beings of a dual nature. We have, on the one side, an autonomous will and an autonomous reason; on the other side, we have psychic contents forced in on us from without. These latter are utterly alien to the will.

This is faculty psychology of a very extreme sort. The way in which the details of the whole system are worked out would be worthy of some devout scholastic, only that there is perhaps more torturing of scripture to suit the purpose of the system than any scholastic would venture upon. Just one instance of this exegetical tendency need be given. In a footnote we read: "Cf. Matt. 25, 29: 'Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath'; *i. e.*, out of the unselfish inclinations that are present there grow, under the impulse of the norm, natural virtues and a sense which cannot do enough for itself therein. But whoever should wish merely to imitate another in these virtues for virtue's sake, when he has not the corresponding inclinations, or when he only uses them to gain a merit for himself, must have denied to him just that virtue of which he boasts" (p. 287).

The system can best be presented to the reader in a short sketch of the 'psychology' upon which it is based. The most fundamental and original will-act is liking or disliking (*Gefallen* or *Missfallen*), which must be carefully discriminated from feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. "They are evaluations, appreciations or depreciations (*Wert- oder Unwerthaltungen*), the simplest and most original stirrings of the will, the firstlings in the realm of will" (p. 32). These elementary will-acts are directed upon all sorts of objects. Such objects, because objects of will, are values, and fall into three classes, "occasional values (*Zustandswerte*), personal values (*Personenwerte*), and foreign values (*Fremdwerte*). The occasional values are any of our own states or conditions of feeling, exclusive of astonishment (*Staunen*) and admiration (*Verwunderung*). Thus, pleasure is an object of liking and therefore an occasional value. The personal values are "the bearers (*Träger*) of all the so-called states and acts." Every one has a "liking for himself as a person with a soul." Schwarz gives as instances of this liking for our souls, our liking for our own beauty (!), cleverness, power, etc." (p. 37). These are, it is true, not the highest instances, but the only other instances given are ambition to be regarded as beautiful, clever, rich, etc., while "that moral dislike of one's own person called remorse," together with ugliness (*Hässlichkeit*), infirmity (*Schwäche*) and sickness (*Krankheit*) are *Personenunwerte* (p. 37). In the third and last group of values (foreign values) are included (a) the objects of our "love, friendship, reverence, and admiration" (including God), (b) human totalities (*Gesamtheiten*) such as family and nation, and (c) the true, the beautiful, and the good. Values under sub-group (a)

are called altruistic foreign values ; sub-groups (*b*) and (*c*) are in-altruistic. The objects embraced under (*c*) are called ideal foreign values (p. 38). This classification of values is of the utmost importance in Schwarz's ethics, as will soon appear.

Our likings are of various degrees of saturation (*Sättigung*). "We call every liking unsaturated (*ungesättigt*), which fills us with desire (*Wünschen*), every liking saturated, wherein desire disappears" (p. 32). The instances given are our likings for a merely imagined successful drawing in a lottery, and for an actual successful drawing. We like both kinds of successful drawings, but the former kind fills us with desire, the latter does not. The former is therefore unsaturated, the latter saturated. These saturation-differences (*Sättigungsunterschiede*) depend upon various circumstances, *e. g.*, in the above instance, on the difference between an object possessed only in imagination and one possessed in actual fact. All these circumstances are alien to the will ; they are the result of external causes. But though thus foreign, still an *a priori* faculty has a function to perform with reference to them. "Were it not so, there could be neither hard and fast laws nor acts of preference. We should merely imagine that we choose. Everything called choice would take place mechanically." Fortunately things are not so. "For we experience particular acts of preference ; likewise the circumstances under which we experience them point to the fact that these acts are directed by their own autonomous laws" (pp. 39, 40). There are two sorts of acts of preference, called analytic and synthetic, respectively. In analytic preference we choose the more saturated liking. This choice would seem to be determined by merely external causes, inasmuch as it is determined by degrees of saturation which in their turn are determined by external causes. But this would make preference heteronomous, and heteronomous it must not be. Hence heteronomous it is not. The faculty *freely* chooses that which it would seemingly have to choose anyway, even if it did not choose to choose it, and by making a virtue of necessity it saves its autonomy. But after all, analytic preference is "comparatively paltry and unfruitful" (p. 42). Synthetic preference is the great thing, for it makes distinctions instead of merely finding and freely recognizing them.

In analytic preference we choose the better, because it is empirically the better ; in synthetic preference, what we choose is the better, just because we choose it. Now, when does this creative act of preference take place ? The answer is that it takes place when we have, as alternatives for choice, objects lying in different

value-groups. Thus, between occasional values (*Zustandswerte*), analytic preference chooses that which more completely saturates our liking. But when we have a choice between an occasional value and a personal value, or between a personal value and a foreign value, degrees of saturation have or should have—Schwarz is not certain whether they always have or only ought to have—nothing to do with the case. There are *a priori* will-norms which tell us what to choose. These norms find expression in two laws. “They command us to place the willing of personal values higher than the willing of every occasional value, and the willing of unselfish [=foreign] values higher than the willing of every selfish value” (pp. 43, 44). In a conflict between such values “we cannot but always place the willing of personal over that of occasional value, always the willing of foreign value over that of all selfish value” (p. 43). Now morality consists in obeying these laws (p. 46). As there are two laws, there are two spheres of morality, the morality of personal values or of self-assertion, and the morality of alien values or of self-denial. The casuistical treatment of moral questions under these two heads constitutes the bulk of the book. And delicious tit-bits of casuistry it is, that are served up to us here in splendid mediæval fashion. For instance, these norms are applied to the case of an inconsiderate churl who insists on smoking in a hot hall where a mixed company of men and women have assembled to hear a lecture. The fellow sins against the second norm in preferring his own pleasure to the comfort of others. But what ought his companions to do, and why? It would seem that in accordance with the second norm they ought to submit. But no. “As if they were not moral and spiritual beings and had not the same natural right to consideration as those to whom they accord the right! More: in weakly giving in to another’s selfishness, they sin against themselves; for they deny the ideal of a kingdom of true human dignity. They should feel themselves as representatives of all moral beings in like predicament, and lay down their veto. They should maintain their own true personal worth and that of others against the occasional value of the selfish fellow. Instead of which they allow others to toy with their good-natured person, in order to—enjoy a pleasure!” (pp. 279, 280.) Why not, if the second norm commands the subordination of one’s own personal values to foreign values including the occasional values of others? (Occasional values of others are foreign values, p. 38.) The general principle that we should not subordinate personal values to the occasional values of others (p. 212) is inconsistent with the second

norm. The theory will not work, and a casuistical reference to the duty of acting as representative of others in like predicament is lugged in to patch up the trouble.

The whole volume appears like a belated product of some past century. True, there are references enough to Wundt and to Nietzsche, to Lipps and to Von Ehrenfels, but these do not serve to modernize the performance.

E. B. MCGILVARY.

Experimental Psychology: A Manual of Laboratory Practice. By EDWARD BRADFORD TITCHENER, Vol. I. Qualitative Experiments: Part I, Student's Manual, Part II, Instructor's Manual. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1901.—Part I, pp. xviii, 214, Part II, pp. xxxii, 456.

A first-rate text-book in a new department of science is an achievement of which anyone may well be proud; and when the book is a laboratory manual, in which every statement must rest upon actual, and often on many times repeated, trials, it represents an outlay of patience and industry that is not apt to be realized by anyone that has not tried the task himself. The difficulties are not lessened when, as in experimental psychology, there is small consensus as to what the aim of such a course should be. Professor Titchener has done a service to teachers of the subject, not only in gathering an excellent list of tried experiments, but also in stating clearly at the start and insisting throughout that the purpose of laboratory practice is to train in rigid methods of introspection, as well as to give first-hand knowledge of the methods and results of experimental psychology. All points considered, the work is unquestionably the best manual of the subject yet published.

The two parts now ready deal with qualitative experiments only, and are to be followed by others on the standard quantitative experiments. The entire course is planned for a year's work with third-year college men who have already had one year's lectures on general psychology. Thirty-seven major experiments are described, twenty-six upon sensation, affection, attention, and action, and eleven on perception, ideas, and association of ideas. These major experiments are themselves frequently divided into several stages, and attended by subsidiary or alternate tests in considerable number, so that the full tale of separate experiments is much greater than the thirty-seven indicated by the table of contents. The scope and arrangement of the course may be inferred from the titles of the major experiments. Part I, Chap.